University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Wharton PPI B-School for Public Policy Seminar
Summaries

Wharton Public Policy Initiative

Fall 9-24-2019

Summary: Business Innovation Creates Policy
Disruption
Sarah E. Light
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi_bschool
Part of the Behavioral Economics Commons, E-Commerce Commons, Other Economics
Commons, Technology and Innovation Commons, and the Work, Economy and Organizations
Commons
Recommended Citation
Light, Sarah E., "Summary: Business Innovation Creates Policy Disruption" (2019). Wharton PPI B-School for Public Policy Seminar
Summaries. 10.
https://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi_bschool/10

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi_bschool/10
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Summary: Business Innovation Creates Policy Disruption
Summary

New forms of business in the sharing economy, and new technologies like autonomous vehicles, have the
potential to “disrupt” existing regulatory structures. This seminar examined the challenges facing regulators
and legislators, who must respond so as to both (a) promote innovation and (b) protect the public interest.
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Better-informed policymaking through a deeper
understanding of economics.

Summary: Business Innovation Creates Policy
Disruption
Seminar by Professor Sarah Light
Disruptive innovation has a technical meaning to business scholars. It signifies when a new firm
picks off customers from an existing business, by coming up with a new product or service that is
actually slightly inferior to the product or service offered by the existing firm. For instance, Airbnb
offers up rooms in people’s homes in place of a traditional hotel room. Some (but not all!) disruptive
innovations lead to what might be called policy disruption, in that they in some way challenge the
current regulatory regime. 1
FOUR TYPES OF POLICY DISRUPTION

• End-run whereby the innovator is able to argue—notwithstanding

similarities to the incumbent industry—that it is not subject to regulations that govern the incumbent. Think of Uber’s argument that it is not a
taxi service and thus should not be regulated as such.

• Exemption in which the innovating firm fits into an express

exemption in the law, but when the innovator scales up, it produces the
same problems that the existing law was designed to address, raising the
question of whether the exemption needs to be closed. For example: Let’s
suppose a woman wants to rent a room in her private home. For privacy
and personal comfort, she may legally choose to only rent the room to
another woman, despite laws that protect against sex discrimination. But
what if large numbers of female Airbnb hosts elected to do that same
thing, and rent only to other women? That could create a social problem
that anti-discrimination laws were designed to prevent.

• Gap where there is no existing regulatory regime that clearly applies to
the innovator. Consider automobiles when they were first invented; there
were no regulations governing their use.

• Solution where an innovation actually solves a regulatory problem,

but which may be blocked by existing regulations from entering the mar-

ket. A current example is distributed solar generation, which would solve
aspects of climate change. But over-inclusive legal rules, which might require every individual desiring solar panels to apply for permission to the
state utility commission to connect to the grid, would impede adoption of
the technology.

HOW SHOULD REGULATORS RESPOND?
Just as there are four types of policy disruptions, there are four
kinds of policy responses (although there is not a one-to-one correspondence between disruptions and responses):

• Block - Interpret legal rules so as to prevent the innovator from entering the market.

• Free Pass - Regulators allow the innovator into the market and do

not apply the existing rules that govern incumbents. This is the most innovation-friendly option, but it can endanger if not doom the old business
model, as has happened to taxis wherever Uber and Lyft operate.

• Old Reg - Apply existing rules to the innovating business.
• New Reg - Old rules do not fit, so regulators realize they need to
write new rules to deal with issues raised by innovators.
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Law Review 1561 (2017), and Sarah E Light, Advisory Nonpreemption, 95 Washington University Law Review 325 (2017). The Three-Step Process chart appears at page 1610 of Regulating Business
Innovation.

With all of the options, aside from the Block, a secondary policy
question also arises: What, if anything, should be done for the
incumbent firms? Should incumbents be compensated in some way
for the market changes produced by the entry of the innovating
business? The question of a buyout should be separate because we
don’t want regulatory system to be picking winners and losers, or to
inhibit access to innovations that people find useful.
Aspects of Uber pertain to all of the possible policy responses.
When Uber and Lyft first launched, Philadelphia, for instance,
initially instituted the Block, declared them illegal and prohibited their drivers from operating within the city. Other locations
instituted the Free Pass, allowing Uber and Lyft to operate without
requiring that they comply with regulations applied to taxis, while
others took an Old Reg approach, bringing Uber and Lyft into the
local market while applying at least some of the current regulatory
regime—for example, background checks for drivers. And then
there were places such as California that implemented a New Reg
response, creating an entirely new type of entity called a transportation network company, with its own rules and requirements. (At
the same time, some localities also may have adjusted rules for
taxis.) And then came the question of buyouts—for instance, taxi
medallion owners in New York City who have brought suit against
the city over the decline in the value of their medallions when the
city failed to block the entry of Uber and Lyft.

Case Example: Autonomous Vehicles
AVs are an excellent subject for a study of policy disruption, to illustrate how we should regulate, as well as who
should regulate. Current law puts the regulation of vehicles
in to the hands of the federal government, as defined by
the Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, which makes the
US Department of Transportation responsible for issuing
vehicle safety standards. Regulation of drivers, however,
is left to the states, which are responsible for licensing and
setting insurance rules, traffic safety laws, and tort laws. The
development of AVs, however, poses a policy disruption: Is
the AV a “motor vehicle” or is it a “driver” . . . or is it both . .
. or neither? And thus should regulation be left to the states,
or to the federal government . . . or some combination . . . or
none of the above?

From a business perspective, what should regulators be concerned
about, with respect to balancing innovation with the public interest?
Focus on substance over form. Unless there is some public interest
that dictates otherwise, treat incumbents and innovators equally
under the law if they provide the same product or service, even if
they deliver it in different forms.

WHO SHOULD REGULATE

THREE-STEP PROCESS

Disruptive innovation (in the business sense) does not always
lead to policy disruption. When it does, policymakers benefit from
having a roadmap to make regulatory oversight decisions. If additional regulation is needed, “who should regulate” (state or federal
government) may be part of the decision making process. Policymakers need to consider whether local or national concerns will
predominate. There are four possible responses to the “who should
regulate” dilemma:

STEP ONE
Does the existing legal regime treat the innovator differently from the
incumbent based on its form of business organization?
Does it Block entry of the innovator and protect incumbents? Does it give
the innovator a Free Pass to the detriment of the incumbent?
Default principle should be organizationally neutral law.

• No regulation –private standards, self-regulation;
STEP TWO

• Federal regulations preempt state laws;

Should the neutral default be outweighed by public policy factors?
If yes: Block or Free Pass (non-neutral), depending upon whether the policy
concerns outweigh neutrality principle.
If no: OldReg or NewReg (both can approach neutrality), depending upon
whether existing rules can be applied to both the incumbent and the
innovator, and whether the innovator raises any new policy concerns.

• States regulate in absence of Federal law;
• Concurrent (dynamic) jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Innovation in business is not only important for a strong economy,
it is a natural response to changing technologies and consumer demands. Yet, it is the role of government to protect consumers from
fraud, unsafe products, and general malfeasance. The three-step
process outlined in this summary can serve as a general road-map
for deciding how much regulatory oversight is needed to protect
public interest while not tampering innovation.

STEP THREE
Does the policy strategy upset an incumbent’s reliance interests,
dilute revenue streams, or strains assets for the incumbent in ways
that we should care about? If so, consider adding a Buy Out to the
chosen strategy:
Free Pass: strongest case for a Buy Out
NewReg: weaker case for a Buy Out
OldReg: intermediate case for a Buy Out
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